(Read the fabulous book The General's Son, written by the son of an Israeli general involved in the Six Day War, to learn more about the motivations and machinations behind this conflict.)
The details of this war are complex and hotly-disputed. What's not in dispute is that most Israelis genuinely believe they would have been under existential threat if their government hadn't acted first, and most Arabs genuinely believe it was an Israeli war of aggression and expansion. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 242, which called for peace between Israel and its neighbors in exchange for Israel giving back the land it had acquired during the Six Day War. Negotiations about how to implement it went nowhere. The Sinai was returned to Egypt under a separate peace deal in 1979, but the Golan Heights and the Palestinian territories remain under occupation.
The Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza were not given citizenship in Israel or equal protection or benefits under the law. The Israeli government also violated the Geneva Conventions by confiscating Palestinian land and water resources and building settlements on the West Bank and Gaza. For twenty years, the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza were a traumatized, defeated, docile population, routinely humiliated by soldiers and used as cheap labor in the Israeli economy.
Then in 1987, the Palestinian population collectively rose up against Israel's repressive policies. The uprising, which became known as the first Intifada, was characterized by mass civil disobedience, general strikes, boycotts, refusals to pay taxes, and Palestinian youths throwing stones at Israeli tanks and soldiers. The word intifada means 'shaking off,' and this was the Palestinians' first attempt to assert their own national identity rather than waiting for Arab armies or the UN to do it for them. More than 1,100 Palestinians and 150 Israelis were killed in the ensuing five years, and tens of thousands more Palestinians were injured or arrested.
The conflict was a public relations disaster for Israel. Videos were shown around the world of Palestinians armed only with flags and slingshots facing down tanks, and of Israeli soldiers beating terrified Palestinian children. Israel began to lose its cherished image as the David against the Arab Goliath. Instead it began to be seen as the Goliath against the Palestinian David. Israelis also began to realize that the occupation could not be maintained indefinitely without cost. Many on the Israeli left began to oppose the occupation.
The Intifada also worried Yasser Arafat, the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a coalition of Palestinian nationalist resistance groups with Fatah at its center. Founded in 1964, it was admitted to the UN with observer status in 1974 and was regarded as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It initially operated out of Jordan and Lebanon, engaging in guerrilla tactics in an attempt to regain Palestine by force of arms. It was expelled from Jordan in 1971 by King Hussein, then expelled from Lebanon in 1982 by Israel, at which point it fled to Tunisia. By the time the Intifada broke out, the PLO was largely out of touch with life in the Palestinian territories. It had played no part in leading or organizing the Intifada.
In 1988, in order to gain recognition for the PLO and save himself from irrelevance, Arafat agreed to recognize Israel and renounce terrorism. It was a historic compromise. He unilaterally surrendered Palestinian claims to 78% of historic Palestine and agreed to focus aspirations for Palestinian statehood solely on the remaining 22% -- the West Bank and Gaza.
Five years later, in 1993, Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo Accords, hailed as a blueprint for peace between the two peoples. It was the first time Israelis and Palestinians publicly recognized each other as partners for negotiations toward peace rather than enemies who might be defeated by force of arms. (In October 1994, Israel signed a peace treaty with Jordan, leaving Syria and Lebanon the only countries bordering Israel still in a state of conflict with it.) After that, the 'two-state solution' became the mantra of the mainstream.
The Accords created the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by Arafat and his associates and based in Ramallah. It had limited administrative and security duties in the West Bank and Gaza while Israel retained control of water, airspace, borders, imports, exports, residency, travel, taxation, currency, etc. This arrangement was supposed to last for a five-year period during which Israel and the PA would engage in trust-building measures and negotiate final-status issues such as East Jerusalem, refugees, borders, and settlements. It was hoped that an independent Palestinian state -- and peace -- would follow.
Two years later, Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli who opposed the Oslo Accords. Rabin's replacement, Shimon Peres of the Labor Party, was narrowly defeated a year later by Benjamin Netanyahu of the right-wing Likud Party. Netanyahu opposed the Accords, rejected the idea of a Palestinian state, and intensified settlement building in the occupied territories. In all, 380 Palestinians and 260 Israelis were killed during the 'Oslo peace years' of 1993-2000, and the settler population surged from 250,000 to more than 400,000.
In July of 2000, the Labor Party was back in power, and Israeli public opinion had moved away from Netanyahu's hard line approach, which soured relations with the Western and Arab worlds without any benefit to security. But Israelis were wary because Hamas and Islamic Jihad had committed fourteen suicide bombings during the Oslo years. And Palestinians felt betrayed because instead of retreating from the occupation as promised, the Israelis had only intensified it. Tensions were high.
President Bill Clinton, in his final months in office, met with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat at Camp David, Maryland, for a last-ditch effort to negotiate a two-state solution. The talks failed spectacularly. From the Israeli perspective, Barak made a 'generous offer' -- including more than 90% of the West Bank and parts of East Jerusalem -- which went further than any other Israeli leader had been willing to go. Arafat had snubbed it, proving he was 'no partner for peace.'
In the view of the Palestinian delegation, Palestinians had already conceded 78% of their homeland. Barak's 'offer' was to annex additional highly sensitive areas of the West Bank (including most of East Jerusalem), deny Palestinians genuine sovereignty, and totally ignore the refugees and their legitimate rights under international law.
(For a fairly centrist explanation of what went wrong in the negotiations, see: Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, "Camp David: The tragedy of errors," New York Review of Books, August 9, 2001.)
In any case, each side blamed the other, and trust broke down completely. The explosive atmosphere reached a flashpoint in September of 2000, when the second Intifada erupted. Soon afterwards, Israelis voted in a new Prime Minister -- Ariel Sharon of the right-wing Likud party. The unrest spiraled from Palestinian protests and deadly Israeli repression into riots, assassinations, suicide bombings, and massive Israeli military incursions. The conflict became known as the second Intifada.
To learn much more in an enjoyable and page-turning narrative, check out my book Fast Times in Palestine: